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LADINJehan Perera
Colombo, 10.10.2005
There was once a theory
that no ceasefire in Sri Lanka would last for more than 100 days.
The reasoning was that the LTTE would not wish a ceasefire to go
beyond a hundred days on account of the damage it might do to the
militant morale of its cadres. The breakdown of the ceasefires of
1991 and 1995 in which the LTTE launched surprise attacks on the
Sri Lankan armed forces appeared to back this line of reasoning.
The LTTE's own justification for withdrawing from the past
ceasefires was the absence of progress in those peace processes.
On each of those occasions the fighting that erupted after the
breakdown of ceasefire was more terrible than what was
before.
The present ceasefire is the fruit of the Ceasefire Agreement
signed on February 22, 2002 by the Sri Lankan government and
LTTE. It brought to a full stop a civil war that had been
steadily escalating in intensity and spread, with hundreds of
casualties after each battle, and crippling even the country's
sole international airport several months earlier. The
transformation of the country after the ceasefire is a cause for
celebration. Most positively, from a people's point of view,
would be the remoteness of a return to war in the past. There
were many who feared that the ceasefire of 2002 would likewise be
the forerunner to worse bloodshed than experienced ever
before.
But now the ceasefire has passed the three year mark. In the
larger perspective, it has been a successful ceasefire and the
fears of the sceptics have not materialised. The latest report on
the observation of the Ceasefire Agreement by the international
monitors of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission revealed that there
had been close to several thousands of violations of the
ceasefire by the LTTE over this period and a few hundreds by the
government. There were a large number of killings, mostly by the
LTTE. But neither the LTTE nor the Sri Lankan armed forces have
engaged each other in direct military combat during this period.
There were also three incidents when LTTE ships suspected of
smuggling in arms were sunk as a result of naval action or
pursuit. But there was no retaliation by the LTTE or mutual
fighting.
Whatever may be their personal rivalries, the actions of the
political leaders of the country have been by and large
responsible during the period of the three year ceasefire.
President Chandrika Kumaratunga had to put up with the injury to
her dignity of having the Ceasefire Agreement signed without her
knowledge by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and LTTE leader
Velupillai Prabhakaran in February 2002. As the executive Head of
State and Command in Chief of the armed forces, President
Kumaratunga could have scuttled the Ceasefire Agreement at its
outset. But she bore the humiliation with considerable
graciousness.
When President Kumaratunga joined hands with the JVP to form a
political alliance to topple the government headed by Prime
Minister Wickremesinghe, there seemed to be a danger to the
Ceasefire Agreement. This danger stemmed from the JVP's stance
that the Ceasefire Agreement constituted a betrayal of the
country. The JVP advocated abrogating the Ceasefire Agreement and
expelling the Norwegian facilitators. But the victory of the
PA-JVP alliance at the general election of April 2004 did not
bring about this worst case scenario. Instead it saw a gradual
shift in the position of the JVP towards a more responsible
stance that has continued to safeguard the ceasefire and its
gains.
There is also a second positive feature of the present
situation. It is the LTTE's demonstrated willingness to be
flexible on the issue of working with the government on tsunami
reconstruction. Prior to the tsunami, the LTTE appeared to have
dug its heels in on the issue of the proposed Interim Self
Governing Authority (ISGA). In November 2003 the LTTE proposed an
LTTE dominated interim government with comprehensive powers for
the entirety of the north east, including the areas currently
under government control. It insisted that it would not engage
with the government in talks on anything other than the ISGA. But
with the ISGA proposal demonised in the country by opponents of
the LTTE, the government was unable to find the political will to
engage on this particular issue with the LTTE.
Following the tsunami of December 26, 2004, however, the LTTE
has been negotiating with the government on establishing a
temporary mechanism to access and disburse tsunami funds from
international sources. Setting up this temporary mechanism does
not require all the heavy baggage that accompanies the ISGA
proposal with its plans for separate law courts and control of
the coastal seas, among others. It may be possible to establish a
tsunami mechanism with a short time frame to perform its tasks,
after which the government and LTTE can together decide whether
to scrap it or enhance its powers and scope. Opposition leader
Ranil Wickremesinghe's offer of cooperation to the government to
deliver tsunami relief to the affected people fits in with the
need of the government and LTTE to establish a joint tsunami
mechanism for north east relief for a short period. However, the
refusal of the government's junior partner, the JVP, to accept
such a joint mechanism remains a major constraint in the forward
movement of the peace process. Unfortunately, in recent weeks the
JVP has been launching ferocious verbal attacks against NGOs and
sections of the media that they accuse of promoting the
Norwegian-facilitated peace process. The JVP's opposition the
signing of an agreement on a joint tsunami mechanism with the
LTTE is based on its fear that it will be the first step towards
the establishment of an interim administration for the north east
modelled on the LTTE's ISGA proposal.
The natural instinct of those attacked would be to keep their
distance from the JVP and to attack them in turn. Those who seek
a long term and sustainable solution to the ethnic conflict need
to bear in mind the importance of obtaining a national consensus
on its solution. The JVP is no longer a fringe or marginal party.
Instead it is one of the biggest political parties in the
country, with hundreds of thousands of voters and perhaps
millions who agree with its nationalist views. As the junior
partner in the government the JVP has the ability to derail the
government's peace effort by withdrawing its parliamentary
support to the government. As a party in opposition, the JVP has
an unparalleled ability to mobile its supporters onto the street
to fight with its political opponents.
Many years ago, when the civil war was at its height, and
hundreds were dying in battle every month, a handful of
organisations, such as the National Peace Council, took the
position that there could be no political solution to the ethnic
conflict from which the LTTE was excluded. Therefore, they urged
that any peace process should bring in the LTTE as a partner and
as an integral part of the solution. Time has proved them right.
Similarly, it is necessary to adopt the same position today with
regard to the JVP. There can be no viable political solution to
the ethnic conflict from which the JVP is excluded.
Jehan Perera, director of the National Peace Forum, Colombo, Sri Lanka.